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Abstract
This study analyzes one-leader and multiple-follower Stackelberg games with private infor-
mation regarding demand uncertainty. In the equilibrium of the Stackelberg games, a leader's
private information becomes public information among followers. This study demonstrates that
the strategic relationship between the leader and each follower is determined by the weight on
public information regarding a follower's estimation of demand uncertainty. If the weight is
suciently low (high), then the relationship is a strategic substitute (complement), and the
leader has a rst-mover (dis)advantage, respectively. In the case of strategic complementarity,
the leader can exit from a market. The threshold is determined by the intensity of Cournot
competition among the followers.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In strategic situations with state uncertainty, each agent decides his action by using his available
information. If the agent can know the information that others possess, then he can anticipate
their actions. By denition, public information is held by all agents. Therefore, public infor-
mation is a focal point for the actions of others. Recent literature on information economics,
following Morris and Shin (2002), includes discussions on the interrelationships between strate-
gic behavior and public information. Angeletos and Pavan (2007) and Ui and Yoshizawa (2013)
provide characterizations of those interrelationship using general Bayesian games.1 These stud-
ies consider simultaneous-move games with uncertainty. We call simultaneous-move games
horizontal competitions.2 Furthermore, the studies assume existence of exogenous public infor-
mation
In contrast, this study analyzes sequential-move games with uncertainty. We call sequential-
move games vertical competitions. Specically, we consider one-leader and multiple-follower
Stackelberg competition with demand uncertainty. In the vertical competition, if the leader
intends to gain a prot from the advantage of a rst move, then his action is exposed to all
followers. Moreover, by followers' observation of the leader's actions, followers can know the
leader's private information. Consequently, the leader's private information endogenously be-
comes public information among followers. Furthermore, in horizontal competition, the public
information is a focal point for the actions of followers, as described in the recent literature on
information economics. Hence, our model can extend the literature to analyze the interrela-
tionships between strategic behavior and public information, for both horizontal and vertical
competitions, which endogenously generate public information.
1Other studies in the literature include Angeletos and Pavan (2004), Arato and Nakamura (2011, 2013), Cornand
and Heinemann (2008), Dewan and Myatt (2008, 2012), Hellwig (2002), James and Lawler (2011, 2012a,b), Morris
and Shin (2007), Svensson (2006), and Myatt and Wallace (2014).
2Angeletos and Pavan (2007) and Ui and Yoshizawa (2013) consider Cournot games as an industrial organization
application. In another branch of the literature, Vives (1984, 1988, 2008, 2011) and Myatt and Wallace (2013) analyze
large Cournot games.
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It is well-known that, under deterministic demand, the leader has a rst-mover advantage
because he/she can commit a quantity of supply. However, under demand uncertainty, a follower
can have second-mover advantage. A follower can decide the quantity of supply after observing
the leader's private information, which is inferred from the leader's equilibrium supply. Hence,
a follower can estimate unknown demand more correctly using his own private information as
well as that of the rst mover. This suggests that the follower has an information advantage.
As a result, a second-mover's information advantage can dominate a rst-mover commitment
advantage. We demonstrate that the strategic relationship in vertical competition is determined
by the weight on public information regarding followers' estimations of uncertainty. If the weight
is suciently high (low), then the relationship is a strategic substitute (complement), and
the leader has a rst-mover (dis)advantage because the commitment (information) advantage
dominates the information (commitment) advantage, respectively.3
On the other hand, horizontal competition is a strategic substitute regardless of the weight on
public information because of the fundamental structure of Cournot competition. As Cournot
competition among followers becomes intense, the output of each follower decreases and the
total output of followers increases, similar to deterministic Cournot competitions. However,
vertical strategic relationships change the degree of output reduction of followers because the
action of each follower is aected by strategic relationships with other followers as well as the
leader. In the case of vertically strategic substitutability (complementarity), followers strongly
(weakly) decrease their output; and the total output of followers increases weakly (strongly).
Particularly, in the case of vertically strategic complementarity, the leader can exit from a
market if the weight on public information, or the intensity of competition among followers,
is suciently high. Furthermore, we analyze total industry prots, using a benchmark case
where all rms move simultaneously. Given the intensity of competition among followers, total
3This result is closely related to Gal-Or (1987). She shows similar results in one-leader and one-follower Stackelberg
games with demand uncertainty in a segmented market. Furthermore, there exists the vertically extended research of
Gal-Or (1987). Shinkai (2000) and Cumbul (2014) analyze sequential n-times-move Stackelberg games.
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industry prots are greater (less) than the benchmark if the vertical relationship is a strategic
substitute (complement). Additionally, total industry prots are maximized when the leader
exits from a market.
Finally, we briey discuss two points. The rst point is the endogenous timing of a leader's
entry. When the leader has a rst-mover advantage in the case of vertically strategic substitu-
tion, the leader naturally moves rst. In contrast, when the leader has rst mover disadvantage
in the case of vertically strategic complementarity, he/she gives up the right of rst mover and
simultaneously makes a decision with followers. Then, the leader can achieve the same level of
prot as the followers, who never have second-mover advantages. The second point of discussion
is the concavity of the function regarding total industry prots. If there exists one follower,
then that follower uses public information only to estimate demand uncertainty. However, if the
number of followers increases, then each follower uses public information to forecast not only
the uncertainty but also the actions of others. In the case of a low number of followers, the value
of public information as a focal point is low, and the value of reducing uncertainty is relatively
high. As the number of followers increases, the value of a focal point becomes relatively higher.
As a result, the form of the function changes form concave to convex as the number of followers
increases.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, and Section 3 derives
equilibrium. In Section 4, we analyze the properties of equilibrium. In Section 5, we discuss
items such as the endogenous timing of entry and the value of public information for industry.
Finally, in Section 6, conclusions are provided.
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2 THE MODEL
Demands and payos A market consists of n+1 rms indexed by i 2 f0; 1; : : : ; ng. Firm
i chooses the quantity of production qi  0. The inverse demand function is given by
p = a   + u Q; a >  > 0; (1)
where p is the market price, Q Pni=0 qi is the aggregate production, and u is a random variable
with mean  > 0 and variance 1=,  > 0. No rm can directly observe the realized value of
the prior random variable u. Payo function of rm i is dened as
i(q; x)  p  qi = (a   + u Q)qi: (2)
Information structure Assume that one of the rms acquires a chance to move rst. The
rm is denoted by i = 0 without loss of generality. Firm 0 receives private information x0 on
u. Then, x0 satises that E(x0ju) = u and V ar(x0ju) = 1=,  > 0. We further assume that
the other rms i 6= 0 produce the goods after observing the output of rm 0. They also observe
the private signal xi on u. Here, xi satises E(xiju) = u and V ar(xiju) = 1=,  > 0.
We restrict our attention to the posterior expectation of u and the conditional expectation
for xi given xj 6=i that satisfy linearity. Some combinations of prior and posterior distributions,
for example, the combination of Gamma-Poisson, Beta-Binomial, and Normal-Normal distribu-
tions, satisfy following linearity.4
Assumption 1.
E(ujx0; xi) = E(xj 6=ijx0; xi) = x0 + xi + 


; (3)
4The rst two combinations satisfy non-negativity. If we assume a >  1=2 in Normal-Normal distributions, then
a    + u is positive with a probability more than 0:997, that is, nearly 1. More detailed discussions are found in
DeGroot (1970), Gal-Or (1987), Shinkai (2000), and Cumbul (2014).
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E(ujx0) = E(xi 6=0jx0) = x0 + 

+ 
; (4)
E(ujxi 6=0) = E(x0jxi) = xi + 

 + 
; (5)
where   +  + .
Strategies We denote pure strategy space by R+ and support of a private signal by Xi.
Firm 0 chooses its quantity of supply depending on its private information x0. Its strategy can
be denoted by q0 = H(x0), where H : X0 ! R+. Firm i 6= 0 chooses its quantity of output
depending on its private information xi and the leader's realized output q0. Their strategy can
be written as qi = G(xi; q0), where G : Xi  R+ ! R+.
Importantly, H() and G(; ) may have many types of functional forms in equilibrium as
discussed in Gal-Or (1987), Shinkai (2000), and Cumbul (2014).5 However, we assume that
H() and G(; ) are ane transportations because of the following reasons. First, in equilibrium,
second movers can always infer a rst mover's private information by the inverse function of
H(), ifH() is a monotone function. Second, our information structure satises linearity. Third,
the payo function of each rm is quadratic in its action. Formally, we derive the equilibrium
strategy prole that satises following equations: 8x0 2 X0,
q0 = H(x0) = arg max
q02R+
E[0(q0; G(xi6=0; q0); u)jx0] = A0 +A1x0  0; (6)
8xi 6=0 2 Xi and 8H(x0) = q0 2 R+,
qi6=0 = G(xi; q0) = arg max
qi2R+
E[i(q0; qi; G(xj 6=0;i; q0); u)jxi; q0]
= B0 +B1xi +B2q0  0; (7)
where A0; A1; B0; B1; B2 2 R.
5See page 283 in Gal-Or (1987).
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Timing of the game At t = 0, nature draws the unknown demand u and each rm receives
xi on u. At stage t = 1, rm 0 as a Stackelberg leader chooses q0 given x0. At t = 2, rms i 6= 0
as Stackelberg followers and as Cournot competitors decide qi given xi and q0.
3 DERIVATION OF THE EQUILIBRIUM
Our plan to derive the equilibrium is as follows. First, we ignore the non-negativity constraint
regarding qi, and we solve the model by backward induction. Next, we check whether the
derived equilibrium strategy satises the non-negativity constraint.
3.1 Without a non-negativity constraint
Second movers At stage 2, each follower chooses its production, given xi6=0 and q0. The
objective function is Ei = E[(a  + u Q)qijxi; q0], for any i 6= 0. The rst-order conditions
are:
@Ei
@qi
= 0 , 2qi = a   + E [ujxi; q0]  q0   E
24X
j 6=i;0
qj
xi; q0
35 : (8)
In the equilibrium, from (6), second movers can correctly infer x0 from q0: x0 = (q0  A0)=A1.
Hence, from (3), (6) and (7), we have
E
24X
j 6=i;0
qj
xi; q0
35 = (n  1)B0 +B1    A0A1 

+B1


xi +

B1
A1


+B2

q0

: (9)
Substituting (3) and (9) into (8), we have
2qi =a  

1  


  A0
A1


  (n  1)

B0 +B1



   A0
A1



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+ [1  (n  1)B1] xi +

1
A1


  1  (n  1)

B1
A1


+B2

q0: (10)
Comparing the coecients of (10) with that of (7), we have
2B0 = a  

1  


  A0
A1


+ (n  1)

A0B1
A1


 B1 
  B0

; (11)
2B1 = [1  (n  1)B1]  ; (12)
2B2 =
1
A1


  1  (n  1)

B1
A1


+B2

: (13)
First mover At t = 1, rm 0 chooses its supply depending on x0. The objective function is
0 = E
 
a   + u Q q0jx0. The rst-order condition is
@E0
@q0
= a   + E(ujx0)  E
0@X
j 6=0
qj
x0
1A  2q0   q0X
i6=0
@qi
@q0
= 0: (14)
Using (4), (6) and (7), we have
a  
+ 
   2A0   n

2A0B2 +B0 +B1

+ 


 

2A1   
+ 
+ n

2A1B2 +B1

+ 

x0 = 0: (15)
(15) should satisfy for any realization of x0. Hence,
a  
+ 
   2A0   n

2A0B2 +B0 +B1

+ 


= 0; (16)
2A1   
+ 
+ n

2A1B2 +B1

+ 

= 0: (17)
From (3), we dene   + that represents weight on public information regarding followers'
estimation of u. Then, solving the system of ve equations (11), (12), (13), (16), and (17), we
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obtain the following result:
A0 =
X(; n)
2Y (; n)

a  
+ 


; A1 =
X(; n)
2Y (; n)


+ 

;
B0 =
Yn(; n)
Y (; n)
(a  ); B1 = Yn(; n)
Y (; n)
; B2 =  Xn(; n)
X(; n)
; (18)
where
X(; n)  (1  3)n+ 1 + ; Y (; n)  (1  )n+ 1 +  > 0:
Non-negativity constraint We can easily check qi 6=0 > 0. On the other hand, q

0 is not
always non-negative. Here, q0 can be written as follows.
q0 =
X(; n)
2Y (; n)

a  
+ 
 +

+ 
x0

Furthermore, Y (; n) and the value in the blanket is strictly positive because we assume a >
 > 0 and (almost all) the support of x0 is positive. Therefore, X(; n) determines the sign of
q0. Then, we have the following non-negativity condition.
Proposition 1. If X(; n) > 0, then q0 > 0. If X(; n)  0, then q0 = 0.
From X(; n) > 0, we can dene two thresholds regarding  and n:
 <   n+ 1
3n  1 2 (1=3; 1]; n < n 
8>><>>:
+1
3 1 ; if  > 1=3;
1; if   1=3:
(19)
Observation 1 in Gal-Or (1987) shows that the leader always chooses a positive output.
Similarly, in our model, if n = 1, then X(; n) > 0 always holds and the leader always chooses
a positive output. However, departing from her observation, if n  2, then  is strictly smaller
than 1. This suggests that, in contrast to Gal-Or (1987), horizontal competition by followers
can drive out the leader from the market if  2 [; 1).
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3.2 With a non-negativity constraint
If X(; n)  0, the leader chooses q0 = 0. Then, we assume that the followers play a Cournot
competition without rm 0. Then, an observation of rm i 6= 0 is only xi. Therefore, we assume
linear equilibrium such that qci6=0 = G
c(xi) = Bc0 + B
c
1xi, 8xi 2 Xi. The payo of followers is
i = E[(a    + u  
P
j 6=0 qj)qijxi], and the rst order condition is qi = 12 [a    + E (ujxi)  
E(
P
j 6=0;i q
c
j jxi)]; where E(
P
j 6=0;i q
c
j jxi) = (n   1)[Bc0 + Bc1( +xi + + )]: Hence, qci can be
rewritten as
2qci = a 

 + 
 (n  1)

Bc0 +B
c
1

 + 


+ [1  (n  1)Bc1]

 + 
xi: (20)
Using a method of undetermined coecient, we have
Bc0 =
a
n+ 1
  

(1 + n) + 2
; Bc1 =

(1 + n) + 2
:
Then, Eqc0 = 0 and Eq
c
i6=0 =
a
n+1 .
Summing up the results, we have following proposition.
Proposition 2. The unique pure strategy equilibrium of the game is
1. If X(; n) > 0, then
q0 =
X(; n)
2Y (; n)

a  
+ 
( + x0)

; (21)
qi 6=0 =
@ lnY (; n)
@n
(a   + xi)  @ lnX(; n)
@n
q0: (22)
2. If X(; n)  0, then qc0 = 0 and
qci6=0 =
a
1 + n
  
2 + (1 + n)
(   xi):
We also have ex ante expected production:
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Corollary 1. (i) If X(; n) > 0, then
Eq0 =
a
2

X(; n)
Y (; n)

; Eqi =
a
2

2Yn(; n) Xn(; n)
Y (; n)

;
E
X
i 6=0
qi = n
a
2

2Yn(; n) Xn(; n)
Y (; n)

; E
X
i
qi =
a
2

Z(; n)
Y (; n)

;
where Z(; n) = 2(1  )n+ 1 + . (ii) If X(; n)  0, then Eqc0 = 0 and Eqci6=0 = an+1 .
3.3 Benchmark case
For future reference as a benchmark, we derive the equilibrium that all rms play Cournot
competition. Hence, the strategies of rms are dependent on their private signals and there
is no public signal except for prior belief. The proof of the following Lemma is similar to
Proposition 1.
Lemma 1. The linear equilibrium in which all rms simultaneously move is qac0 = A
ac
0 +A
ac
1 x0
and qaci6=0 = B
ac
0 +B
ac
1 xi, where
Aac0 =
a
n+ 2
  ( + 2)

42 + [4+ 2(n+ 1)] + (n+ 2)
;
Aac1 =
( + 2)
42 + [4+ 2(n+ 1)] + (n+ 2)
;
Bac0 =
a
n+ 2
  (+ 2)

42 + [4+ 2(n+ 1)] + (n+ 2)
;
Bac1 =
(+ 2)
42 + [4+ 2(n+ 1)] + (n+ 2)
;
and ex ante expected production and prots are
Eqac0 = Eq
ac
i6=0 =
a
n+ 2
; Eac0 = E
ac
i6=0 =
a2
(n+ 2)2
: (23)
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4 EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze properties of the equilibrium. First, we characterize the strategic
relationship between the leader and followers. Second, we show the results of comparative
statistics regarding ex ante expected production. Third, total industry prot is analyzed.
4.1 Strategic relationship in vertical competition
Note that B2 represents slope of followers' reaction function to leader's action.
B2 =  @ lnX(; n)
@n
=  Xn(; n)
X(; n)
=
 (1  3)
(1  3)n+ 1 + 
In the case of X(; n) > 0, the strategic relationship between the leader and each follower is
determined by the sign of Xn(; n) = 1  3.
Proposition 3. If  > 1=3,  = 1=3 and  < 1=3, then followers' reaction functions are upward,
constant and downward sloping; thereby, the strategic relationship is complementary, neutral,
and substitutive, respectively.
This result is closely related to Gal-Or (1985, 1987). Gal-Or (1985) shows that, in the
deterministic Stackelberg duopoly model, the rst mover has an (dis)advantage if the reaction
functions of the players are downwards (upwards) sloping. The slope in her model is determined
by deterministic parameters. On the other hand, Gal-Or (1987) and our model show that, in
the model of Stackelberg games with demand uncertainty, the slope of reaction functions can
be upward sloping because of the conditions of uncertainties. Gal-Or (1987) assumes that
the markets faced by each rm are partially segmented. She shows that, if the markets are
suciently segmented, then the reaction function of follower can be upward sloping. On the
other hand, our model assumes a perfectly integrated market. The results of Gal-Or (1987) and
our study dier because of the generality of assumptions regarding signals.
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OEqi6=0

a
2(n+1)
a
n+2
a
n+1
a
2
Eq0
Eqci6=0
Eqi

advantage
Second-mover
advantage
First-mover
1=3 1
Figure 1: Eect of weight on public signals
4.2 Comparative statics
Proposition 4 (Comparative statics). (i) If X(; n) > 0, then
@
@
Eq0  0;
@
@n
Eq0 < 0;
@
@
Eqi 6=0  0;
@
@n
Eqi6=0 < 0;
@
@
X
i 6=0
Eqi  0;
@
@n
X
i6=0
Eqi > 0;
@
@
X
i
Eqi  0;
@
@n
X
i
Eqi > 0:
(ii) If X(; n)  0, then
@
@
Eqci6=0 = 0;
@
@n
Eqci6=0 < 0;
@
@n
E
X
i6=0
qci > 0:
Weight on public information Figure 1 shows the results of comparative statics regard-
ing the weight on public signals given the intensity of followers' horizontal competition. When
 = 0, the leader produces more than the followers: q0 > qi . As  increases, the leader's pro-
duction decreases, and each follower's production increases: @Eq0=@ < 0 and @Eqi =@ > 0. If
 = 1=3, then the leader's output corresponds with the follower's output. This suggests that,
13
1 n
a
2
Eqi6=0
a(1+)
4
a(1 )
2
0
Eqi=0 Eqci6=0
Second-mover advantage
n
qi
Figure 2: Eect of intensity of horizontal competition:  > 1=3
if  < 1=3 ( > 1=3), the leader has a rst-mover (dis)advantage. Intuition is related to the
tradeo between commitment advantage and information advantage. If a leader who has a low
(high) precision of private signal reveals a low (high) precision of private information, then that
leader's commitment advantage dominates (is dominated by) the followers' information advan-
tage. Finally, if    2 (1=3; 1], the leader refrains from production; then,  decreases with n.
This indicates that the more followers that exist, the leader stops production at smaller . This
eect can also be examined by @2Eq0=@@n < 0 and @2Eqi6=0=@@n > 0. If n increases, slopes
of Eq0 and Eqi6=0 become steeper.
Intensity of horizontal competition All rms reduce output with respect to n that
can be regarded as intensity of horizontal competition: @Eq0=@n < 0 and @Eqi 6=0=@n < 0.
However, the eect is changed by . If   1=3, that is, the region of a rst-mover advantage,
then the output of rm 0 is no less than that of the follower's. Hence, rm 0 always chooses
non-negative output because followers produce non-negative output. If  > 1=3, then the
output of rm 0 is less than that of follower's. That is, if horizontal competition is suciently
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1=3 1

O
na2
(n+1)2
(n+1)a2
(n+2)2
(2n+1)a2
4(n+1)2
c
ac


Figure 3: Total industry prot
intense (n  n  (+ 1)=(3  1)), then rm 0 stops production and followers play a Cournot
competition without rm 0. Therefore, a follower's production is kinked at n (see Figure 2).
The reason why rm 0 stops production is that, unless an individual follower reduces output,
the total output of followers increases with respect to n that can be regarded as the intensity
of followers' horizontal competition: @
P
i6=0Eqi=@n > 0. Consequently, unless rm 0 has a
rst-mover commitment advantage, the intensity of followers' competition excludes rm 0 from
the market.
4.3 Total industry prot
From Proposition 1, we can easily derive ex ante expected prots.
Corollary 2 (Ex ante expected prots).
E0 =
8>><>>:
a2(1+)X(;n)
4Y (;n)2
; if  < 
0; if   
; Ei6=0 =
8>><>>:
a2(1+)2
4Y (;n)2
; if  < 
a2
(n+1)2
; if   
:
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A total industry prot is dened as follows:
 
nX
i=0
Ei =
a2(1 + )Z(; n)
4Y (; n)2
; if  < :
c 
nX
i=1
Eci = n
a2
(n+ 1)2
; if   :
We treat total prots of Cournot competition by all rms as the benchmark.
ac =
nX
i=0
Eaci = (n+ 1)
a2
(n+ 2)2
Figure 3 shows total industry prots. If  < , then  increases with . The reason is that
the increase of
P
i 6=0Eq

i is greater than the decrease of Eq

0 as  increases; @
P
i6=0Eq

i =@ >
@Eq0=@. Then, the increase in the total prot of followers is greater than the decrease in the
leader's prot. When  = 1=3,  corresponds to ac. This is because B2 = 0 suggests that
followers ignore a leader's production, and this corresponds to the situation where all rms play
Cournot competition. If   , then the leader chooses q0 = 0; thereby,  corresponds to
c. Furthermore,  is maximized in this case. Because the leader exited from the market,
competition reduces in intensity. Hence, the prot of each follower increases.
5 Discussions
Endogenous timing of production A large body of literature discusses the endogenous
timing of entry, for example, as in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), Normann (2002), and Homann
and Rota-Graziosi (2012). We briey discuss the issue of timing of a leader's entry. In the case
of a rst-mover advantage ( < ), the leader naturally moves rst. However, in the case of a
rst-mover disadvantage, the leader should not move rst. If the leader moves simultaneously
with the followers, then the prot of the leader is higher than that in the case of rst-mover
disadvantage from (23). The prot of the leader is the same as that of the followers. Figure 4
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Figure 4: Eect of weight on public signal
shows the result.
Industry value of public signal We restrict our attention to  < . Then,
@
@
=
a2n2(1  )
Y (; n)3
 0; and @
2
@2
=
a2n2(; n)
Y (; n)4
;
where (; n)  (1 n) 2+n. These results show that the industry value of the public signal
is increasing, but that concavity of  is determined by (; n). Figure 5 graphically depicts the
results. When n  2 (n  3),  is negative (positive), that is, the industry prot is concavely
(convexly) increases with . The intuition is as follows. If n = 1, a public signal cannot work
as a focal point because the follower need not to coordinate other followers. However, if n  2,
a public signal starts to work as a focal point. Furthermore, the coordination becomes dicult
with increasing number of followers. Simultaneously, the value of public signal as a focal points
becomes higher. Consequently, the form of  changes from concave to convex as the number of
followers increases. This result suggests that, if we endogenize information acquisition in future
research, we might discover solutions that are determined by the precision of signals.
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6 Conclusion and future researches
In this study, we analyzed one-leader and multiple-follower Stackelberg games with demand
uncertainty, and obtained the following results. First, the strategic relationship in vertical
competition is determined by the weight on common signals regarding follower's estimation of
uncertainty. If the weight is suciently high (low), then the relationship is a strategic substitute
(complement), and the leader has a rst-mover (dis)advantage. Second, in contrast to Gal-Or
(1987), a rst mover can exit from the market if the intensity of horizontal competition is
suciently high, or if the weight on common signals is suciently high. Third, total industrial
prot is maximized when the leader exits from the market. These results connect two branches
of the literatures. One branch is the classical literature on industrial organization. One of its
main interests is rst-mover (dis)advantages in vertical competition. Another branch is the
recent literature on information economics. One of its main interests is the interaction between
strategic behavior and public information in horizontal competition. The main contribution of
this study is providing a simultaneous analysis of these two branches of scholarship.
There are still some open questions. First, we assume the precision of exogenous signals.
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Introducing the cost of acquiring signals, we could endogenize the equilibrium precision of signals
as in Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009), Myatt and Wallace (2012), Colombo et al. (2013), Ui (2013),
and Arato et al. (2014). Then, the discussion in Section 5 is pertinent. Second, we assume the
number of followers exogenously. Assuming the cost of entering a market, we could endogenize
the number of followers. Third, it might be useful to consider the implications of analyzing
the social surplus as in the study of Vives (1984, 1988, 2008, 2011), which addresses the large
Cournot model with strictly convex production costs. While our paper chose to emphasize
strategic situations, these three points merit attention in future research.
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